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Abstract
We examine whether armed conflict, international and domestic terrorism affect distribution of
bilateral and multilateral foreign aid. We argue that the two types of aid may respond differently
to security challenges because of donors’ disparate objectives and aid-giving motives. The results
show that armed conflict reduces the amounts of obtained aid of all types, conditional on a country
being an aid recipient. Multilateral donors are also less likely to include a conflict-ridden country
on a recipient list. Domestic terrorism increases bilateral aid, but this effect appears to be entirely
driven by assistance from the United States, arguably a terrorist prime-target country. When
we disaggregate aid flows by their purposes, we find that international and domestic terrorism
are associated with increases in bilateral aid for promotion of governance, education, health and
society.




What is the impact of armed conflict and terrorism that occur within a state on the probability
of receiving foreign aid and its amounts? Are the effects of domestic and international terrorism
identical? In spite of recent improvements in the understanding of the linkages between foreign
aid, conflict and security (e.g. Balla and Reinhardt, 2008; Young and Findley, 2011; Boutton,
2014; Bezerra and Braithwaite, 2016), the full answer to this question has remained largely obscured
by the complexity of the aid allocation picture where various types of aid are allocated by a number
of heterogeneous donors to an even larger number of heterogeneous recipients. For example, many
donors appear to specify sector-level objectives for their assistance, however, much of the debate
does not disaggregate aid flows but instead treats them uniformly (e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000;
Azam and Thelen, 2010; Nielsen, Findley, Davis, Candland, and Nielson, 2011). But why should
we expect different types of aid to respond in the same way to varying levels of development,
democracy, peace, stability or security? By distinguishing between bilateral and multilateral donors
and disaggregating aid flows by key purposes this article uncovers some of this complexity and
provides empirical evidence on the effect armed conflict and terrorism have on foreign aid receipts.
Traditionally, aid giving has been seen as an altruistic redistribution of resources from developed
nations to developing countries to fight poverty and promote economic growth, good governance
and social development (Azam and Laffont, 2003). Nonetheless, economists and political scientists
have long recognized that aid may also serve a number of strategic purposes: it may be used
to extend donor’s cultural, economic and political influence, strengthen military allies, achieve
security objectives, or as an incentive or reward for behavior desired by the donor.1 Whether
donor’s intentions are altruistic or strategic, conflict and terrorism may affect their aid allocation
calculus. For example, conflict and terrorism have been shown to have negative effects on economic
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growth and social development (Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides, 2004; Collier, 2006; Gaibulloev
and Sandler, 2009), thus donors whose objective is to promote growth and development may be
discouraged from providing assistance to affected countries. On the other hand, a donor driven
by strategic considerations may choose to use aid to support an ally in conflict or help another
state in fighting terrorism before it directly affects donor’s interests (Boutton and Carter, 2014).
Thus, the overall relationship between aid and political violence is likely to be an outcome of
opposing factors and mechanisms, which may differ across types of aid, recipients, donors and
time periods. This underpins the importance of disaggregating aid flows into their respective
types and components when asking whether donors give more or less aid to countries affected by
armed conflict and either international or domestic terrorism. Our analysis expands the existing
evidence by adding the following dimensions.
First, we consider bilateral and multilateral aid separately, whereas most studies focus only on
bilateral aid (e.g. Young and Findley, 2011; Savun and Tirone, 2011; Boutton and Carter, 2014).
The two types of donors are expected to react differently to various factors because of their differing
policy objectives. Multilateral aid should be more responsive to the quality of policies and government
in receiving countries and promote military expenditure reductions (Boyce and Pastor, 1998).
This is because intergovernmental institutions are less likely to be influenced by commercial interests,
strategic alliances, and geopolitical or historical considerations which often drive decisions of
bilateral donors (Alesina and Weder, 2002; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Nunn and Qian, 2014;
Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2016; Mamoon, 2016).
Second, we disaggregate aid into four sectors: (i) governance, (ii) education, (iii) health and social
assistance, and (iv) business and trade. As discussed in the next section, investments in these
sectors tend to have different implications for peace and security as well as donors’ strategic interests.
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Thus, we may observe different patterns across these aid flows.
Third, we distinguish between international and domestic terrorism. Since this distinction is implemented
by using the data from Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev (2011),2 we follow their definition of
terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or subnational groups
against noncombatants in order to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation
of a large audience beyond that of the immediate victims” (Enders et al., 2011, pp. 321). An
attack is considered to be an act of domestic terrorism when the perpetrators, victims, target and
venue all come from one country, i.e. domestic terrorism directly affects citizens and/or property
of only one country. In contrast, an international attack involves perpetrators, victims, targets
and/or venues from at least two countries (Enders et al., 2011). Majority of existing studies consider
either only international terrorism or all terrorist attacks (e.g. Azam and Thelen, 2010; Young
and Findley, 2011). We postulate that from a donor’s point of view domestic and international
terrorism are fundamentally different because of their varying effects on donor’s interests and
consequently we expect different responses to these two types of violence. In particular, we would
expect bilateral aid donors to be more responsive to international terrorism which is more likely
to directly threaten their strategic objectives, but we also recognize that donors’ sensitivity to
this form of violence may be muffled by its relatively low intensity: international attacks are nearly
four times less frequent than domestic ones (Enders et al., 2011) and cause significantly less damage
than armed conflict (Blomberg et al., 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009). We also anticipate a
degree of sensitivity of bilateral aid to domestic terrorism which over time often leads to international
terrorism (Enders et al., 2011). Thus, donors may feel that they cannot ignore homegrown terrorism
abroad and choose to provide assistance to affected countries.
Our empirical strategy is based on a two-part model estimated for 184 aid recipients over the
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period from 1973 to 2007. At the gate-keeping stage a probit model is used to estimate the likelihood
of receiving foreign aid, while the allocation stage makes use of the panel data properties and
introduces a lagged depended variable, to account for aid-giving inertia, and recipient-fixed effects
to estimate the amounts of aid allocated to recipients. Subsequently, we test the sensitivity of
our results to various model specifications and estimation methods. Throughout this exercise, we
are particularly interested in linkages between foreign aid and armed conflict, defined as a use
of armed force causing at least 25 battle related deaths (see Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson,
Sollenberg, and Strand, 2002), as well as international and domestic terrorism.
The results confirm donors’ aversion to armed conflict and its substantial impact on aid allocation.
Countries experiencing conflict are less likely to become recipients of multilateral aid. Having
passed the gate-keeping stage, recipients with armed conflict can expect the amounts of bilateral
and multilateral aid to be cut by approximately 22% and 30%, respectively. At the sector level,
conflict negatively affects the probability of receiving multilateral aid within all four considered
sectors, whereas bilateral donors’ aversion is manifested only in aid for health and social assistance,
and business and trade.
The estimates show a positive effect of terrorism on bilateral aid. Countries suffering from international
terrorism seem more likely to become recipients of bilateral aid (although this effect is only marginally
significant), but despite our expectations, international terrorism does not affect the amounts
of received aid. The positive effect of domestic terrorism is borne out at the allocation stage:
recipients of bilateral aid receive significantly higher levels of aid than their counterparts without
domestic terrorism. Nonetheless, this effect appears to be driven by the United States aid. The
relationship between terrorism and aid is also visible at the sector level. Both types of terrorism
positively affect bilateral aid aimed at governance, education, social and health assistance. In
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contrast, multilateral aid is not affected by either international or domestic terrorism.
In summary: armed conflict reduces the amount of either bilateral or multilateral aid, conditional
on being a foreign aid recipient, whereas terrorism seems to increase bilateral aid for the promotion
of governance, civil society, health and education.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. First, we discuss our research hypotheses
along with the existing literature. We then explain our data and their sources as well as lay out
our estimation approach. In the two final sections we discuss our results and conclude.
2 Background
The economics and international relations literature is abundant with studies of determinants of
foreign aid. Bandyopadhyay and Vermann (2013) review recent evidence on the donors’ motives
and note that over time the focus of foreign aid has moved from development to donors’ strategic
considerations. In an earlier study, Burnside and Dollar (2000) establish some determinants of
bilateral aid and conclude that bilateral donors tend to promote their strategic political interests
over poverty reduction, promotion of openness, democracy and good policies. Lis (2013) shows
that they are also likely to turn a blind eye on the quality of civil rights, conflict and terrorism
in oil exporting countries, but react to the size of recipient’s fuel exports. Younas (2008) adds
to the debate showing that OECD countries donate more to importers of goods in which the
donor has a comparative advantage. A study by Fleck and Kilby (2010) echoes these findings
and shows that the importance of need as a condition for aid eligibility decreased in the 1990’s
and relatively higher income countries have been more likely to receive aid in the aftermath of
the September 11 attacks than during the Cold War. In this paper we investigate how allocation
of bilateral and multilateral aid responds to armed conflict and terrorism which, as argued below,
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may influence decisions of donors who are driven by either altruistic developmental motives or
strategic considerations. The remainder of this section outlines our main research hypotheses
along with a brief overview of the literature informing each of them.
2.1 Aid and conflict
There are several channels through which armed conflict can affect donor’s decisions on aid allocation
and the importance of each channel is expected to be a function of the donor’s motivation. Donors
who prioritize developmental impact are likely to be averse to armed conflict which causes a significant
destruction of human and physical capital and consequently may reduce recipient’s capacity to
absorb aid, fuel corruption, retard important reforms and economic growth (Alesina and Weder,
2002; Blomberg et al., 2004; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009). In some cases, aid may lead to a
perpetuation or escalation of conflict by being misappropriated to fund military ventures (e.g.
Collier, 2007, 2009; Nunn and Qian, 2014), lowering the receiving government’s accountability to
its population or draining high quality personnel from the public sector (Knack, 2001). On the
basic technical level, reduced security increases the risks and costs associated with sending aid
workers into the field, thus donors preoccupied with aid efficiency may choose to keep away from
conflicted regions and spend their resources where operational costs are lower and more can be
achieved for each dollar spent.
Donors who are not driven by strategic objectives may also be wary of interfering in other states’
internal affairs and consequently be reluctant to provide assistance in conflict situations when
two or more political groups compete for power. Yet, strategically-minded donors may see such
a situation as an opportunity to further their interests by providing aid to their preferred party,
hoping to assert its advantage in conflict. According to this logic, donors willing to gain access
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to conflict or influence its outcome would favor conflict-stricken states at the gate-keeping stage,
while those preoccupied mostly with development would focus their scarce resources on recipients
more capable of sustaining stability and economic growth (see Balla and Reinhardt, 2008).
Nevertheless, even strategically-minded donors may be discouraged by armed conflict that is
inevitably linked to high levels of political risk (Mamoon, 2016). The instability and internal
tensions reduce transparency and elevate the risks of corruption and misappropriation of aid
funds (Le Billon, 2003), potentially reducing donor’s influence on the delivery of agreed objectives.
Furthermore, donor’s commercial interests may suffer from a destruction of resources, reduced
income base, uncertain property rights as well as increased operating and trading costs in an
affected country.3
Following these arguments, we state our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Armed conflict within a country reduces country’s probability of receiving foreign
aid and its amount.
We verify the validity of this hypothesis by applying it separately to total bilateral and multilateral
aid as well as their sectoral variants. Our discussion indicates that depending on donor’s motives,
the expected utility of aid may be affected by armed conflict in different, possibly contrasting,
ways and thus the net effect may either cause aid to decrease, increase or remain unchanged.
This makes us reluctant to formulate expectations with respect to this hypothesis. Although, we
expect multilateral donors to be somewhat more conflict averse than their bilateral counterparts
who are more likely to be driven by strategic political or commercial interests.
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2.2 Aid and counterterrorism
As in the case of conflict, there are several channels through which terrorism may affect distribution
of foreign aid and their proclivity is likely to depend on donor’s motives as well as the type of
terrorism, domestic or international. The aftermath of 9/11 saw the researchers’ increased interest
in the political instability and aid nexus. For example, Chauvet (2003) and Bezerra and Braithwaite
(2016) find that relatively low levels of instability have a positive impact on aid allocation as
donors attempt to safeguard their interests. However, when the intensity of violence increases,
the higher threat to donors’ commercial and strategic objectives may persuade them to shift
their attention, and consequently money, to more stable places. This shows the importance of
distinguishing between potentially opposing aid effects of armed conflict, typically associated with
high levels of violence and destruction, and terrorism which entails lower levels of instability and
thus is more likely to have a positive effect on aid.
Strategically-minded donors may use aid as a tool in combating terrorism as the recipient’s counterterrorism
efforts demonstrate substitutability with donor’s own security measures and may allow to thwart
terrorism at its origin, before it spreads to the donor’s homeland or affects their interests elsewhere
(Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas, 2011). Indeed, countries targeted by international terrorism
have been shown to respond by assisting states from which this activity originates. For example,
the United States provides aid to countries within whose borders terrorists threatening the US
security operate (Boutton and Carter, 2014). We argue that also domestic terrorism may have an
aid-attracting effect because prime-target bilateral donors may wish to preempt the “evolution”
of domestic into international terrorism, a process which often happens over time (Bapat, 2007;
Enders et al., 2011). Furthermore, foreign assistance may appear necessary to aid states with a
terrorism problem because many of them are relatively poor and unable to afford counterterrorism
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measures on their own (Enders and Sandler, 2006; Lis, 2011).
The approach of aiding terrorism-plagued countries may be effective: Azam and Delacroix (2006)
and Young and Findley (2011) provide evidence that increased aid results in reduced levels of
terrorism originating from the receiving country. Azam and Thelen (2008) indicate that the assistance
does not have to be a direct reimbursement for counterterrorist efforts in order to result in reduction
of terrorism. Assistance given to other areas, such as education or healthcare, may help the receiving
government to free up more resources for fighting terrorism as well as increase the opportunity
cost of violence by improving population’s living standards (Meierrieks and Gries, 2012; Caruso
and Schneider, 2013).
Nevertheless, tying aid to counterterrorism may backfire because it sends a signal of the donor’s
strategic security interests and instills confidence in the recipient that aid is unlikely to be withdrawn
even if a part of it is squandered or misdirected. As a result, the recipient’s dedication to achieving
objectives set by the donor may be limited. This unfavorable outcome might be amplified by
the lesson coming from the principal – agent model: if a government is receiving assistance to
fight terrorism, it may be not in its best interest to eliminate the threat completely as this could
stop future aid flows (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011). This assertion is supported by the evidence
that some types of aid prolong terrorist campaigns (Bapat, Hall, and Hill, 2011), make targets
associated with the donor country more valuable to terrorists and consequently may increase
attacks against donor’s citizens and interests (Neumayer and Plümper, 2011).
We formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2 Countries with terrorist activity within their borders are more likely to become
recipients of bilateral aid and its amounts increase with the intensity of terrorism.
Hypothesis 3 Multilateral aid is unaffected by the occurrence of terrorism in a receiving country.
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We anticipate different responses from bilateral and multilateral donors because the latter focus
mostly on the promotion of widely defined development and are not driven by strategic security
considerations (Boyce and Pastor, 1998). Typically, intergovernmental donors are not required
to ensure security of their territory or citizens, thus do not have the same incentives to increase
aid assistance to terrorism-affected states. Terrorism is also unlikely to lead to a reduction in
aid because, unlike armed conflict, it causes limited destruction and in most cases has negligible
effect on growth (Blomberg et al., 2004).
2.3 Sectoral aid and violence
Donors wishing to fight terrorism and prevent armed conflict may feel inclined to direct their
assistance towards particular activities or sectors. The literature to date has showed that resources
dedicated to some purposes can be more effective at reducing instability and therefore we formulate
our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 The response of foreign aid to armed conflict and terrorism differs across aid
sectors.
In this study we focus on foreign aid dedicated to four sectors: education, government and governance,
business and trade, and health and social programs. The four sectors have been selected on the
basis of their expected impact on the root-causes of terrorism as well as significance for the prevention
of violence, as emphasized in earlier literature (e.g. Azam and Thelen, 2008; Young and Findley,
2011; Savun and Tirone, 2011; Selaya and Sunesen, 2012).
Conflict and terrorism are often explained by existing or new grievances, the resource mobilization
or opportunity cost theories (e.g. Piazza, 2011). Each of the above types of aid is likely to feed
into one or more of these channels. For example, investments in education and health services
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may increase the opportunity cost of violence by improving human capital and development in
a wider sense, thus increasing aid dedicated to such programs may be a viable option for donors
who wish to reduce violence. Hence, we propose the following auxiliary hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4a Education aid to a country is an increasing function of terrorism within this
country’s borders.
Hypothesis 4b Countries afflicted by conflict and terrorism receive more aid for health and
social purposes.
Educating societies, especially their male youth, is often perceived as an antidote to radicalization
and a part-solution to terrorism: better schooling and promoting useful skills instead of extremist
values have been shown to reduce terrorism (Azam and Thelen, 2008; Young and Findley, 2011).
Nevertheless, the effect of education on terrorism appears to be contingent on good political,
social and economic environment, and a sound structural change may be required before terrorism
is reduced through investment in education (Brockhoff, Krieger, and Meierrieks, 2015; Elbakidze
and Jin, 2015). Since investment in these two sectors is not likely to be a priority in resolution
of an ongoing armed conflict (aid for health and social purposes does not include humanitarian
or emergency assistance), we expect that a response of this form of aid to conflict will not be
different from that of total aid.
Aid for promotion of democracy and governance may reduce grievances by improving a system of
internal political checks and balances, or giving voice to those feeling oppressed and discriminated.
It may also empower the parts of society which oppose extremism and violence (Savun and Tirone,
2011). Thus, donors may determine that states at risk of political instability and violence deserve
additional external support in these areas. This brings us to our next auxiliary hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4c Donors increase aid aimed at promoting good governance to countries affected by
12
conflict or terrorism.
In countries afflicted with terrorism, an increased provision of governance aid may prove necessary
for boosting government’s capacity to address the terrorist threat. Terrorist organizations often
choose poorer and weaker countries for their bases and operations, where fragile governments
struggle with provision of adequate security (Enders and Sandler, 2006). In the presence of armed
conflict, a strategically-minded donor may feel compelled to provide assistance to a friendly regime
or deny it to a government deemed undesirable.4 Overall, we expect terrorism to have a positive
impact on governance aid, whereas the effect of armed conflict is uncertain.
Our final auxiliary hypothesis concerns aid directed towards business and trade promotion which
can boost physical capital in the receiving country (Selaya and Sunesen, 2012), and subsequently
increase the opportunity cost of violence, making terrorism and conflict more costly to perpetrators.
Nonetheless, we expect the impact of violence on this aid sector to be dependent on its intensity:
Hypothesis 4d Terrorism has a positive effect on the probability of receiving business and trade
aid and its amount, whereas the effect of armed conflict is negative.
Some donors may wish to assist countries affected by terrorism in order to achieve their strategic
security objectives and improve resilience of business sectors in which they have commercial stakes.
This seems plausible for bilateral donors who are potential prime-targets of terrorism originating
from receiving countries or those who have substantial business and trade presence in such states.
However, the much higher levels of risk and destruction associated with armed conflict are likely
to make both bilateral and multilateral donors divert their resources away to places with better
capacity for aid absorption or more favorable business and trade environment.
We believe that the disaggregation of aid flows into respective sectors is a valuable contribution
to the literature, but we also realize that it may prove to be of a limited significance for three
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reasons. First, various types of aid may have an indirect effect on violence by allowing a receiving
government to free up domestic resources in one area and shift them towards counterterrorism
or conflict prevention. Second, according to some accounts as much as 65% of sectoral assistance
is used outside the targeted sectors (Pettersson, 2007). Third, in spite of representing the largest
dedicated aid categories, these four sectors put together account for only 25% and 42% of bilateral
and multilateral aid, respectively (see Appendix Table A1). The remainder of aid commitments is
either unspecified, fungible or divided between a considerable number of smaller sectors.
Summarizing our hypotheses, we expect both types of donors, bilateral and multilateral, to be
averse to onsets of armed conflict, but differ in their responses to terrorism. Bilateral aid to countries
with terrorism within their borders is expected to increase, whereas multilateral aid to remain




Table 1 reports the data sources used in this study along with basic summary statistics. The
figures on foreign aid, and its respective sectoral components, in constant dollars are drawn from
the Project-Level Aid 1.9.1 database made available by AidData.org (Tierney, Nielson, Hawkins,
Roberts, Findley, Powers, Parks, Wilson, and Hicks, 2011). The dataset includes development
finance in a form of either loans or grants from governments and inter-governmental organizations.
For our analysis, we use the data on commitments5 – a similar approach is taken by, among others,
Nielsen et al. (2011), Young and Findley (2011) and Bermeo (2011).
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To address the core question of this study, we introduce three measures of political violence. The
data on domestic and international terrorism are taken from Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev
(2011) who separated the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) into the respective components.
Their dataset reports 44,487 domestic and 10,564 international attacks over the analyzed period.
The data on armed conflict are drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4-
2009, which lists situations “where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least
one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et al.,
2002). This includes wars and minor conflicts of either external or internal nature. Based on this
dataset, we generate an indicator variable which takes a value of one if a country experiences a
conflict in a given year or zero otherwise.
The data on population along with the two macroeconomic variables are drawn from the Penn
World Table Version 7.1 (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2012), which is commonly used in the
literature and does not require detailed introduction. The population size may represent a “need
variable” and be particularly relevant for setting aid levels: a more populous country will require
more resources than an equally wealthy state with smaller population to achieve the same social
impact of an aid program. The two macroeconomic variables are real GDP per capita in constant
dollars, which is another “need variable” and has been shown to play an important role in aid
allocation (Balla and Reinhardt, 2008; Bandyopadhyay and Vermann, 2013; Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith, 2016), and country openness measured as the share of exports and imports in country’s
GDP. The latter may serve as an indicator of good economic policies, but also may be a variable
of interest to bilateral donors from the perspective of trade promotion. Namely, aid helps to finance
trade deficits and promotes higher consumption in developing nations, boosting their imports















































































































































































































































































































































































Previous studies show a significant relationship between received aid and recipients’ level of civil
liberties and democracy (e.g. Chauvet, 2003; Younas, 2008; Savun and Tirone, 2011). Therefore,
we use the Freedom House (2010) civil liberties index which grades states on a scale from one to
seven, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest.6
Bringing the above variables together yields an unbalanced panel dataset for 184 countries covering
years from 1973 to 2007. The choice of 1973 as the starting year is motivated by the fact that
prior to this date, the information included in AidData and GTD is rather spotty. The selection
of 2007 as the ending point is dictated by the availability of decomposed terrorism data in Enders
et al. (2011). The remainder of this section discusses the estimation method.
3.2 Estimation method
The most common method of estimating the aid allocation process has been the selection model.
For example, Boutton and Carter (2014) use the Heckman two-step method, while Bueno de
Mesquita and Smith (2007) base their empirical strategy on logit and fixed effects panel regressions
without the Heckman correction. The selection model approach divides the process into the gate-
keeping and allocation stages. At the gate-keeping stage donors choose countries to which aid is
given and at the allocation stage they decide the amounts of aid granted to selected recipients.
This paper follows the distinction between the two phases and employs the two-part model (2PM)
as discussed by Vance and Ritter (2014). The two authors note that the Heckman selection bias
correction procedure assumes that observations are missing but in the context of foreign aid allocation
they should be treated as actual zeros: we can observe whether aid was granted so there is no
Heckman-style selection problem. The results of the Heckman procedure are interpreted as potential
results which means that they measure the effect of an explanatory variable on foreign aid allocation
irrespective of whether aid was expended or not. Vance and Ritter (2014) recommend the use of
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2PM which gives actual outcomes, i.e. coefficients measure the effects of explanatory variables
on the actual amount of aid allocated. The 2PM model is similar to the Heckman approach in
that it also involves the estimation of probit and OLS regressions. The main difference lies in the
model specification: 2PM does not include the inverse Mills ratio in the second stage regression
and does not require the specification of the exclusion restrictions, variables that uniquely determine
the selection process and are not included in the allocation equation. This may be seen as an
advantage because valid exclusion restrictions are often difficult to find.7
We estimate the 2PM model in which the gate-keeping stage is estimated by probit regressions,
while the allocation stage is conditional on a country being an aid recipient (Yi,t > 0) and additionally
includes a lagged dependent variable (LDV) and recipient-specific fixed effects. Our econometric
model can be written as follows:
Selection stage: α1 +Xi,t−1γ + θ1t + ε1i,t > 0, (1)
Allocation stage: Yi,t = Yi,t−1λ+ α2 +Xi,t−1β + θ2t + ηi + ε2i,t, (2)
where Yi,t is the natural log of foreign aid, α1 and α2 are constants, ε1i,t and ε2i,t are recipient
clustered error terms, and Xi,t−1 is a vector of lagged explanatory variables including armed
conflict, log of the number of international or domestic terrorist attacks, log of population, log of
GDP per capita and its square, log of economic openness,8 civil liberties, and dummies denoting
the Cold War and post-9/11 periods. The inclusion of the latter two dummies is motivated by
possibly different attitudes of donors towards aid and security threats during the Cold War period
(see Boschini and Olofsg̊ard, 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2007; Bandyopadhyay and
Vermann, 2013) and at the onset of the “War on Terror”. The attacks of September 11, 2001,
were followed by declarations from many world leaders that they would use foreign aid to fight
terrorism through poverty alleviation (Young and Findley, 2011). Thus, the inclusion of the two
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indicator variables enables us to control for potential changes in the aid giving regimes.
Regressions of both stages include year-specific effects, θ1t and θ2t, that absorb temporal shocks
common to all recipients, e.g. swings in the global business cycle, global changes in attitudes
towards foreign aid as well as global trends in types of observed violence. In addition, the allocation
stage equation includes recipient fixed effects, ηi, to limit the risk of results being driven by time
invariant characteristics of aid receiving countries, such as geographical location, landmass, colonial
history, the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, cultural and linguistic proximity to a donor, dominant
religion, etc.
The inclusion of LDV in the allocation stage accounts for donors’ inertia when deciding the amounts
of aid expended and deals with the autocorrelation problems (Carter and Signorino, 2010). It
also creates a risk of biased estimates in the fixed-effects setting, but this should be negligible
in models with large N and T , as in our case, and any bias is concentrated in the coefficient on
LDV (Judson and Owen, 1999), which is not of main interest in this study.
Finally, all models use yearly observations and the explanatory variables are lagged by one year,
a common practice in the aid literature (e.g. Balla and Reinhardt, 2008; Savun and Tirone, 2011;
Dreher and Fuchs, 2011; Boutton and Carter, 2014). In a recent article, Bellemare, Masaki, and
Pepinsky (2017) warn against this practice as a solution to endogeneity problems as it replaces
a “selection on observables” assumption with an untestable assumption of “no dynamics among
unobservables”. However, Bellemare et al. (2017) also emphasize that lagging explanatory variables
is appropriate when theory suggests that causal effects work with a time lag, as it is in our case,
then the lag identification allows for a correct estimation of regression coefficients as well as helps
to overcome potential endogeneity bias. Our identification assumption that aid allocated in year
t is determined by conditions observed in year t − 1 is chiefly motivated by the expectation that
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donors’ aid policies respond with a delay due to a time lag in variables of interest being reported
by prospective recipients (an information lag) as well as donors’ own budget planning procedures
(a decision-making lag). Mosley (1985) and Boschini and Olofsg̊ard (2007) argue that current
year’s spending of aid agencies is predominantly determined by the previous year’s budgets. Thus,
current levels of explanatory variables are unlikely to affect current year’s aid, unless in some
exceptional circumstances of dramatic changes in the donor’s or recipient’s behavior. In addition,
the potential endogeneity worry that time invariant factors that determine both the occurrence
of violence and aid decisions may bias the estimation results is, at least partly, alleviated by the
inclusion of recipient-specific fixed effects (Bellemare et al., 2017).
4 Results
This section discusses the empirical results obtained through the estimation of the two-part model
(2PM). We begin with the discussion of the results for aggregated aid. Table 2 is divided into
two panels – one with the estimates for total bilateral aid and another one for total multilateral
aid. The first two columns in each panel show coefficients for international terrorism, while the
remaining two columns show estimates for domestic terrorism.
4.1 Armed conflict
The estimates in Table 2 confirm our expectation that multilateral donors tend to be more conflict
averse than their bilateral counterparts. Bilateral donors, who are more likely to be driven by
strategic geopolitical or commercial interests, appear to respond differently to conflict at the
two stages of the aid giving process. They do not exclude conflict-ridden countries at the gate-
keeping stage, but grant them smaller amounts of aid at the allocation stage. The response to





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































for example, some may wish to gain access to conflict or influence its outcome and thus favor
conflict-ridden states at the selection stage, whereas others may be characterized by high levels of
conflict aversion. Consequently, a potential worry is that our estimates representing an average
effect may be driven by a handful of large donors. We address this concern in the robustness
analysis section where we re-estimate the regressions in Table 2 excluding aid flows from the
three largest aid donors (see Table 4).
In contrast, the effect of an onset of armed conflict on the likelihood of becoming a multilateral
aid recipient is statistically significant and negative, thus confirming our earlier expectation. This
category of donors is assumed to prioritize the developmental impact of aid, which is likely to be
retarded by a significant destruction of human and physical capital, high levels of conflict-related
instability and diminished transparency. Additionally, multilateral donors may shun conflict-
ridden states as granting aid requires an agreement of their member states, who may have conflicting
perceptions of the conflict and favor opposing sides. Similarly to their bilateral counterparts,
multinational donors tend to punish conflict by reducing the amount of awarded aid. In both
cases the negative impact of conflict on aid amounts may be possibly driven by recipient’s limited
capacity to effectively administer and absorb external assistance as well as high levels of political
risk which may jeopardize achieving donors’ objectives, whether developmental or strategic.
Since the conflict variable is lagged by a year, one could argue that it does not capture a situation
when donors impose an immediate freeze on aid flows in a face of a new conflict,9 or that the
aid receipts in year t are driven by reconstruction efforts in response to an outbreak of conflict
in year t− 1. We test the sensitivity of our results by applying different lags t− s, s = 0, 1, 2, ..., 5,
to the conflict variable and find results consistent with those in Table 2 for all lags. The lag of
one year appears to return the strongest and most significant effect which then becomes gradually
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weaker as the time lag increases.
4.2 Terrorism
The results confirm our anticipation of different responses to terrorism from bilateral and multilateral
donors and seem to support Hypotheses 2 and 3. Albeit, bilateral donors’ response to international
terrorism appears somewhat constricted in comparison to our earlier expectations. The impact
of international attacks on the probability of receiving foreign aid is positive, but statistically
significant only at the 10% significance level. This possibly positive effect is not transferred onto
the aid amount setting stage, where the estimated coefficient is not distinguishable from zero.
Thus, in spite of our expectations, bilateral aid shows a limited response to international terrorism.
However, the amounts of bilateral aid increase significantly in response to domestic terrorism
once the gate-keeping stage is passed.
As already explained, it is impossible to deduct a single causal mechanism with the available
evidence. For example, it may be the case that violence poses a threat to bilateral donors’ political
or economic interests in the affected country, therefore they prioritize assistance to states with
international terrorism in an attempt to reduce the risks to their interests. The result for domestic
terrorism is likely to be driven by its much greater frequency compared to international terrorism
and worries of some prime-target donors that over time domestic terrorism may spill over to their
homelands, as cautioned by Enders et al. (2011). Thus, such donors may decide to subsidize counterterrorism
efforts of poorer and less capable states, i.e. use aid as a tool in preventing and combating terrorism.
As expected, multilateral donors do not respond to either type of terrorist attacks. This insensitivity
to terrorism could be explained by the absence of a direct security motive for multinational aid
organizations. Unlike armed conflict, terrorism causes limited destruction, has comparably smaller
impact on the capacity to absorb aid and in most cases has negligible effect on growth (Blomberg
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et al., 2004), thus donors with primarily developmental goals may not perceive this form of violence
as a major threat to achieving their objectives.
4.3 Control variables
The results for control variables are consistent with the existing literature and comparable across
the two donor types, with the main difference lying in the effect of trade openness. The size of a
country’s population does not appear to have a significant effect on aid allocation, this is congruous
with Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Fleck and Kilby (2010). GDP per capita enters the regressions
twice: in linear and quadratic forms. The positive linear coefficients suggest that the likelihood
of receiving aid and its amount increase in income, while negative quadratic coefficients indicate
that this is happening at a decreasing rate and eventually a point is reached after which the income-
aid relationship becomes negative (see Bjerg, Bjornskov, and Holm, 2011, for a more detailed
discussion).
Although trade openness may serve as an indicator of good economic policies, it is also likely to
constitute a variable of interest to bilateral donors who reward openness with larger aid flows,
conditional on being an aid recipient. This result is not surprising because some donors use aid
as an export promotion strategy aimed at boosting bilateral trade with aid receiving countries
(Younas, 2008; Bandyopadhyay and Vermann, 2013). In contrast, economic openness does not
have a significant effect on multilateral aid (consistent with Chauvet, 2003; Tingley, 2010). Open
economies tend to have higher GDP and living standards (Dong, 2014) and as such may be lower
on the multilateral donors’ priority list. Furthermore, since open economies are favored by bilateral
donors, multilateral organizations may decide that recipients’ aid needs are largely satisfied by
bilateral assistance.10
Civil liberties are measured by the Freedom House index on the scale from one to seven, with one
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representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the lowest. Thus, the negative estimates in
Table 2 suggest that donors reward freer countries at both stages of the aid giving process. This
is in line with Bandyopadhyay (2007) who find that improvements in civil and political rights
increase received aid. The Cold War period was associated with a smaller likelihood of receiving
foreign aid as well as its smaller amounts. As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) explain, the
rivalry between the West and the Soviet Union was often manifested in attempts to buy influence
in the Third World, however, donors would have been more careful in committing themselves to
giving aid because of the high risk of being outbid by the rival. The aftermath of the September
11 attacks does not appear to have any significant effect on the distribution of neither bilateral
nor multilateral aid.
Finally, the amount of received aid appears to be larger for countries which were receiving aid
in previous years. This could be explained by a number of possible factors, including the donor
inertia, established and functioning aid links and programs, as well as accumulated skills and
experience in obtaining and spending foreign assistance.
4.4 Sectoral aid
In addition to distinguishing between bilateral and multilateral flows, we analyze assistance to
the following sectors: government, education, social and health programs, and business and trade.
Table 3 shows a summary of the 2PM estimation results for armed conflict, international and
domestic terrorism by sector. For brevity, we do not show estimates for the control variables,
which are consistent with those in Table 2. Overall, bilateral donors seem to respond mainly
to terrorism, whereas multilateral donors are less likely to provide assistance in any of the four
sectors to conflict-ridden countries. Recipients who pass the gate-keeping stage successfully are







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































More specifically, the likelihood of receiving bilateral governmental aid and its amount increase
with the frequency of international and domestic terrorism in a receiving country, showing that
bilateral donors tend to support governments of countries with a terrorist problem. As discussed
earlier, such assistance may appear necessary to thwart the existing terrorist threat as terrorist
organizations often chose for their residence poor countries whose governments are unable to
afford counterterrorism measures (Enders and Sandler, 2006).
Columns 3 through 6 of Table 3 display estimates for education, social and health purposes, thus
activities aimed at improving human capital of receiving countries. In line with our expectations,
countries experiencing terrorism within their borders receive greater amounts of bilateral education
aid. This may indicate that donors perceive education as an antidote to radicalization and an
investment in terrorism prevention, as argued by Azam and Thelen (2008), and Young and Findley
(2011).
An onset of armed conflict reduces the probability of a country receiving bilateral (and multilateral)
aid for social and health purposes. At first, this result may appear surprising, but then conflict-
ridden countries are likely to obtain humanitarian assistance (not included in our aid figures)
which may better serve their needs in crisis situations. In contrast, states with either international
or domestic terrorism may find themselves more likely to receive assistance directed at the social
and health sectors.
The last two columns in Table 3 refer to foreign aid promoting business and international trade.
Terrorism does not seem to be linked to this type of aid (thus not confirming Hypothesis 4d),
whereas armed conflict negatively influences the probability of a country becoming a recipient in
this aid category from either bilateral or multilateral sources. This supports our expectation that
donors find the levels of risk and destruction associated with conflict too high and prefer states
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with more favorable business and trade environments.
4.5 Robustness checks
To confirm the soundness of our results and verify whether they are not driven by just a handful
of donors or recipients, or model specification, we perform several robustness checks. As mentioned
earlier, aid donors exhibit a large degree of heterogeneity when it comes to their objectives and
motives. In addition, the aid giving appears to be dominated by a small number of bilateral and
multilateral donors – top three donors in each category account for approximately 57% of aid
flows. We repeat our regression analysis on the following subsamples of the data: first excluding
assistance from the top three donors jointly and then excluding each of them individually. Table 4
reports the summary results of this exercise for both bilateral and multilateral aid. The signs
and significance of estimates of the effect of conflict and terrorism on multilateral aid survive
the treatment, however, the estimates for bilateral aid show some sensitivity to the exclusion of
donors. The response to conflict turns out to be comparable to our baseline results (although
dropping Japanese aid from our sample pushes the selection stage coefficient into statistical significance).
The effect of international terrorism proves to be insignificant in all regressions, which is not
much different from the results in Table 2, where it was significant only at the 10% significance
level at the recipient selection stage. Also, the positive effect of domestic terrorism on the amounts
of bilateral aid appears to be entirely driven by the United States – removing this donor from our
sample makes the estimate statistically insignificant (Column 6 in Table 4). Arguably, among
the top donors, the United States is a prime-target of terrorist activity and thus most susceptible
to potential spill overs from domestic to international terrorism. Consequently, it may feel that
assisting other countries in curbing homegrown terrorism is compatible with American strategic















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results of our remaining robustness checks are reported in Appendix. To address worries that
our estimates may be driven by a handful or aid recipients, we drop the ten largest aid recipients
(Table A2) and failed states, i.e. countries whose governments struggle with projection of their
power, provision of security and other public services (Table A3).11 The results of these exercises
confirm those presented in Tables 2 and 3. Another worry could be that the impact of armed
conflict may be driven by relatively small conflict events that are indistinguishable from terrorism.
Thus, we restrict our conflict variable to only large scale conflicts with at least 1000 battle-related
deaths in a year (see Table A4). In general, this exercise also tends to confirm the main conclusions
from the previous sections. Finally, we compare our 2PM estimates to those obtained through
estimating the Heckman selection model with correction for potential selection bias. We follow
the approach proposed by Lai (2003), and Boutton and Carter (2014), and find no significant
differences between the 2PM and Heckman model estimates (Table A5).
To summarize, our estimates of the effect of armed conflict on bilateral and multilateral aid are
robust to various model specifications, donor and recipient exclusions, whereas the coefficients on
the effect of terrorism are sensitive to the exclusion of the US aid from our sample.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The empirical analysis presented in this paper focuses on the impact of armed conflict and terrorism
on allocation of bilateral and multilateral foreign aid. We employ the two-part model (2PM) and
split the aid giving process into two stages: the selection stage at which donors choose countries
to receive foreign assistance, and the allocation stage at which donors decide amounts of granted
aid. On the sector level, our study considers the impact of conflict and terrorism on assistance
related to governance, education, social and health programs as well as business and trade, the
four sectors which seem vital for the promotion of peace and stability.
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In general, the results confirm our expectations that armed conflict and terrorism play a role in
aid donors’ decision making process. They also tend to suggest that the two types of aid, bilateral
and multilateral, are driven by somewhat different objectives. For instance, while multilateral
donors shun states in armed conflict (this result holds for aggregated and sectoral aid), conflict
does not affect the likelihood of a country being a recipient of bilateral aid, although it does reduce
its levels.
While multilateral donors appear to be indifferent to either type of terrorism, the evidence on the
impact of terrorism on bilateral aid is less clear. International terrorism appears to be positively
correlated with the probability of receiving aggregated bilateral aid, whereas domestic terrorism
may increase its amounts, conditioned on passing the gate-keeping stage. However, the statistical
significance of this result is sensitive to the exclusion of the United States from aid donors.
On the sectoral level, the effects of international and domestic terrorism on bilateral aid are significant
and positive at both the selection and allocation stages for the assistance in government, education,
social and health sectors. The increased assistance to these sectors should be considered as reasonable
because terrorist organizations often choose poorer and weaker countries for their bases and operations,
where fragile governments struggle with provision of adequate security. In such places external
help may be necessary for boosting government’s capacity or supporting structural improvements
required to reduce grievances. Furthermore, investment in human capital may reduce the risk
of radicalization of local populations as well as increase the opportunity cost of violence, thus
making terrorism a less appealing option.
These findings are consistent with the principal–agent model outlined by Bandyopadhyay et al.
(2011) in which poorer countries can count on increased foreign assistance in return for counterterrorism
efforts. In such a framework, bilateral donors use foreign aid as a substitute for their own defensive
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homeland security measures. Although the model suggests that donors’ attention should principally
be concentrated on international terrorism, domestic terrorism may also directly affect donors as
it often grows to international campaigns over time (Enders et al., 2011). Nonetheless, donors
should be aware of an important lesson from the principal–agent model: recipients have their
own objectives and preferences and therefore are unlikely to be entirely committed to eradicating
terrorism within their borders as this would result in a loss of incoming aid. In a perverse situation,
a recipient may resort to encouraging more terrorism in order to increase their aid receipts.
Researchers still do not have a full understanding of the dynamics and interactions within the
foreign assistance, development and political violence nexus. Further advancements will require a
more fine-grained approach which will take into consideration country-specific conditions as well
as more localized effects. Eventually, studies of effectiveness of foreign aid in curbing terrorism
should account for terrorists’ country of origin as at the moment there is little evidence whether
aid reduces attacks performed abroad by citizens of a receiving state.
Notes
1Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2016) present a theoretical model and evidence on buying policy concessions with
foreign aid. Kuziemko and Werker (2006) provide evidence on the United States’ behavior of buying the UN Security
Council votes with foreign aid. The effectiveness of aid in achieving these objectives as well as factors influencing donors’
behavior have been debated, with mixed and often contradicting results (e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Bjerg, Bjornskov,
and Holm, 2011; Nourou, 2014)
2Enders et al. (2011) decompose the Global Terrorism Database into domestic and international terrorism. Unfortunately,
employing this decomposed dataset limits the time span of our analysis to 2007.
3This is likely to apply to most but not all business sectors. Donors with commercial interests concentrated in defense
or security industries may perceive conflict as a business opportunity.
4This “picking winners” behavior could also lead to a donor supporting a rebel group contesting a government which
is undesirable from the donor’s point of view. The governance aid category does not capture such transfers.
5AidData goes beyond aid flows included in the OECD’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) and incorporates
international loans at market rates as long as they constitute an effort to foster economic or social development. The
dataset reports two types of figures: commitments (money allocated to an aid project by a donor) and disbursements
(actual money transfers). Unfortunately, the latter figures are available for only 48.6% of records, while commitments,
which should reflect donors’ perception of recipients’ needs and circumstances as well as be a good proxy for the funds
actually donated, are reported 99.16% of the time.
6We also consider the dichotomous DD democracy index by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2009) and Polity IV
(Center for Systemic Peace, 2016). The results remain consistent with those presented in the article.
7The 2PM model is not a universal remedy; it is based on the assumption that both stages of the model can be treated
as independent conditional on the observed explanatory variables. If this assumption does not hold and the same unobserved
factors affect both stages then the Heckman model should be chosen (Wooldridge, 2010). As a robustness check we also
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estimate the Heckman selection model and obtain comparable results in terms of signs, significance and magnitude (see
Appendix Table A5).
8Taking natural logs of the mentioned variables smooths the distribution of the data and increases reliability of our
estimates.
9This worry is limited by the arguments presented in the method section and donor inertia (see Boschini and Olofsg̊ard,
2007; Nielsen et al., 2011; Boutton and Carter, 2014)
10In our sample, the correlation coefficient between openness and GDP per capita is 0.22 and the 25 most trade-open
aid recipients receive twice as large share of bilateral aid as of multilateral aid.
11We used the 2005 Failed States Index, subsequently renamed the Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace, 2005), which
looks at a range of social, economic and political indicators, and assesses pressures faced by a nation in each of these
categories. The top ten failed states are: Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen.
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